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ABSTRACT 
In this article, we argue that democratic engagement as a form of human action can be enhanced 
if enacted through disclosure. Firstly, we expand on the notion of democratic engagement whereby 
human action is enacted through democratic iterations, mutual respect and humanness. Secondly, 
we argue that practising humanness, such as when one learns from others, can most appropriately 
be enacted when one becomes reflectively open to the new, and reflectively loyal to the known. 
Thirdly, because of the latter point, we draw on Giorgio Agamben’s (2011) notion of denudation 
whereby it is argued that forms of human engagement can become substantively democratic if 
enacted through an unconcealed disclosedness, in other words, an unveiling of the self in which 
visibility and presence (nudity) hold sway. Inasmuch as others open themselves up to one, so one 
ought to disclose oneself to others in order for the encounter to remain democratic. And, when 
such a form of democratic engagement assumes a form of denudation, the possibility is always 
there that human action will be enacted through an unveiling of the self, which is infinitely free of 
secret. Hopefully then, democratic engagement will be more unconstrained and unrestricted by 
that which might be otherwise contained.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In this article, we argue that democratic engagement as a form of human action can be enhanced 
if enacted through disclosure. Firstly, we expand on the notion of democratic engagement 
whereby human action is enacted through democratic iterations, mutual respect and humanness. 
Secondly, we argue that practising humanness, such as when one learns from others, can most 
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appropriately be enacted when one becomes reflectively open to the new, and reflectively loyal 
to the known. Thirdly, because of the latter point, we draw on Giorgio Agamben’s (2011) notion 
of ‘denudation’ whereby it is argued that forms of human engagement can become substantively 
democratic if enacted through an unconcealed disclosedness, in other words, an unveiling of 
the self in which visibility and presence (nudity) hold sway. Inasmuch as others open 
themselves up to one, so one ought to disclose oneself to others in order for the encounter to 
remain democratic. And, when such a form of democratic engagement assumes a form of 
denudation, the possibility is always there that human action will be enacted through an 
unveiling of the self, which is infinitely free of secret. Hopefully then, democratic engagement 
will be more unconstrained and unrestricted by that which might be otherwise contained.  
 
DEMOCRATIC ITERATIONS AND RECIPROCITY AS FORMS OF DEMOCRATIC 
ENGAGEMENT 
By way of introduction, much has been written about the notion of democratic engagement in 
relation to dialogical forms of human action. First, Seyla Benhabib (2011) offers an account of 
deliberative democratic engagement whereby human beings listen to one another with the aim 
to talk back reflexively to one another, that is, to take one another’s points of view into iterative 
scrutiny. In Benhabib’s words, ‘[b]y democratic iterations I mean complex processes of public 
argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims are contested 
and contextualized, invoked and revoked ... in the associations of civil society’ (Benhabib 2011, 
129). In other words, human beings do not just deliberate to allow one another an opportunity 
to respond critically to one another. Rather, their interactions are meant to provoke one another 
to think and to act differently and thus to see the point of their democratic engagements in a 
contested atmosphere without being remiss of treating one another with dignity. In this sense, 
humans are self-interpreting beings who have ‘the capacity to initiate action and opinion to be 
shared by others ...’ (Benhabib 2011, 129). Following Benhabib, democratic engagement is 
therefore not merely associated with enframing people’s collective existence; it is also an 
enlargement of people’s moral perspectives ‘in virtue of their humanity simpliciter’ (Benhabib 
2011, 75).  
Second, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (2004, 178) elucidate collective human co-
existence on the basis that ‘people should be treated as free and equal citizens’. For them, 
democratic engagement is explicitly concerned with people seeking moral agreement when 
they can engage in and/or about public policy through deliberation, and ‘maintaining mutual 
respect when they cannot [reach agreement]’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 178). This kind 
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of democratic reciprocity ‘asks citizens to try to justify their political views to one another, and 
to treat with respect those who make good-faith efforts to engage in this mutual enterprise even 
when they cannot resolve their disagreements’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 179). The point 
is that democratic engagement (reciprocity) calls for people to engage equally with one another 
in an atmosphere of mutual respect even if they vehemently disagree. This kind of dignified 
relationship among humans engaged in democratic reciprocity is cultivated through an ‘open-
mindedness ... [and] respect for differing points of view without either endorsing them as clearly 
correct or rejecting them as clearly incorrect’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 185). In this way, 
through democratic engagement, people not only retain their dignity but the possibility for 
reasonable agreement and disagreement is also always there. That is, democratic reciprocity 
does not require moral detachment from one another. Instead, democratic reciprocity would 
judge injustice harshly and praise just actions (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 186). By 
implication, people engaged in democratic reciprocity will not find themselves detached from 
one another, because moral disagreement should not be a reason for excluding others from the 
deliberation.  
 
TOWARDS AN EXPANDED VIEW OF DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENT THROUGH 
HUMANNESS  
David T. Hansen (2011, 22–23) posits that central to any form of educational experience, 
notwithstanding a democratic one, is a form of humaneness (referred to by Benhabib (2011) 
and Gutmann and Thompson (2004) respectively as ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’). For Hansen (2011, 
22), humanness is tantamount to ‘practicing justice towards others’ in that it ‘privileges learning 
from others over resolving tensions to one’s personal satisfaction’. Whereas, Benhabib and 
Gutmann and Thompson seemingly advocate an understanding of humanness as a democratic 
virtue whereby people are mutually engaged in deliberative iterations and reasonable 
agreements and disagreements, Hansen (2011, 22) explains humanness as ‘a mode of work 
rather than a final achievement’ that involves ‘learning from others’. By the latter, Hansen 
means a capacity to wait and see and listen and a desire to understand the other (Hansen 2011, 
23). In this way, humanness implies a democratic etiquette whereby human beings are not in 
isolation from one another but in perpetual communication. They respect truths and appreciate 
what it means to dwell with one another in community across space and time, differences and 
commonalities. In other words, people in deliberation engage with one another in an uncertain 
world without acts of inhumanity towards one another. They interact with one another and even 
absorb ideas from others without being judgmental and dismissive (Hansen 2011, 70). As such, 
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humans remain open to practices of listening, speaking and interacting, and are receptive 
towards ‘learning with others’, a matter of being in deliberation whereby people show a desire 
to understand each other and to listen and talk to the other. Through deliberative engagement, 
humans engage in an encounter with the new rather than merely a rehearsal of the known, which 
means ‘regarding subject matter (about which they converse) an occasion for new thinking 
rather than projecting into it prior understandings and assumptions’ (Hansen 2011, 12). In other 
words, humans do not just wait for agreement to be achieved but they engage humanely in 
democratic action (Hansen 2011, 28). In enacting oneself humanely in relation to others, 
humans pursue ‘a reflective openness to the new with reflective loyalty to the known’ (Hansen 
2011, 32). In a different way, humans move and artfully engage in practices that ‘reflect a 
conscious concern to conduct themselves in deliberative ways’ (Hansen 2011, 86). In this sense, 
humans remain ‘in process of becoming through the experience of reflective openness to the 
new fused with reflective loyalty to the known’ (Hansen 2011, 86).  
Our interest is in Hansen’s (2011) depiction of humanness as an enactment of democratic 
engagement such that it (i.e. humanness) can cultivate a reflective openness to the new and a 
reflective loyalty to the known. We are attracted to democratic engagement as the cultivation 
of humanness for two reasons. In the first instance, learning from others through a reflective 
openness to the new is a recognition that a democratic encounter can be uncertain, which 
implies that the unexpected can happen. In other words, human relations in an uncertain world 
cannot always be perfectly planned, rationalised and predicted. Currently in South Africa, the 
ruling African National Congress (ANC) could not have anticipated or predicted that its 
political hegemony would be seriously challenged by members of its own party, considering 
the role the party has played in the demise of the apartheid regime, and in ushering in a new 
democracy. Consequently, one finds that Hansen (2011, 54–55) posits that ‘[d]eliberative ways 
of listening, speaking, waiting, reading, writing, memorizing, repeating and judging ... [should 
be attentive to] different points of view and a more patient approach to conflicts of interests and 
concern’. Put differently, being reflectively open to the new firstly implies that democratic 
encounters should remain sensitive to humanness, and secondly, being reflectively loyal to the 
known implies that a more lucid understanding of what is already known would invariably 
enhance one’s understanding of a particular situation. For instance, if it is already known that 
democratic encounters include rather than exclude people, then being reflectively loyal to such 
an encounter means that one can be open to more innovative ways of securing inclusion. Thus, 
by being reflectively open to the new and reflectively loyal to the known, one might avoid doing 
harm to others in a democratic encounter. One would thus have developed a sense of self-
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control which is not dismissive of what other have to say ‘thereby making possible humane 
ways of dwelling together’ (Hansen 2011, 55). On the one hand, the pervading chaos, which 
has come to define any gathering of political parties (whether in parliament, or not), therefore 
offers profound insight into the incapacity and unwillingness of people to encounter the other 
in a meaningful way. On the other hand, ‘humane ways of dwelling together’ become 
impossible when that humanity is not displayed in how others are treated. In this regard, the 
almost daily occurrences of various forms of protest (ranging from shutting down highways to 
the more recent torching of 25 schools in Limpopo [cf. Author, date]) is a loud reminder that 
not only are the majority of people excluded from meaningful democratic encounters, but also 
that their humanness is not being acknowledged by the democracy within which they find 
themselves.  
However, being reflectively open to the new and reflectively loyal to the known implies 
other humans need to open themselves up to one in order for one to learn from them. But, for a 
democratic encounter to be mutually open, one also needs to open up the self to others. Put 
differently, one needs to disclose oneself to others in order for the latter to engage with one 
openly. However, it seems as if democratic iterations and democratic reciprocity might not be 
sufficient to elicit more open and unconstrained forms of human (inter)action. That is, people 
can deliberate iteratively and engage one another reciprocally but this does not necessarily mean 
that they would always exhibit a humaneness towards one another. For instance, after the 
popular uprisings of masses of people against dictatorships on the African continent (for 
example, in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya) – referred to commonly as the ‘Arab Spring’ – several 
governments that initially deliberated iteratively and reciprocally with members of civil society 
became even more inhumane towards any form of public dissent. Our contention is that, unless 
democratic encounters were to take the form of denudification whereby people disclose 
themselves to one another equally and substantively, such encounters will remain truncated and 
possibly become even more prejudiced towards exclusion. The point is that, unless people open 
themselves up substantively to one another, no form of tenable inclusion will ensue. We now 
turn to Giorgio Agamben (2011) for a perspective on denudation with the possibility of people 
engaging in democratic encounters becoming more open and prepared to take risks. 
 
IN DEFENCE OF DENUDATION: DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENT AS AN 
UNCONCEALED DISCLOSEDNESS OF HUMAN SELF  
Nudity, states Agamben (2011, 84), is an image of the human body: 
 
[T]hat is, the trembling that makes this body knowable, but that remains, in itself, ungraspable. 
Hence the unique fascination that images exercise over the human mind. Precisely because the 
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image is not the thing, but the thing’s knowability (its nudity), it neither expresses nor signifies 
the thing ... Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is nothing other than the giving of the thing over to 
knowledge, nothing other than the stripping off of the clothes that cover it, nudity is not separate 
from the thing: it is the thing itself. 
 
Agamben (2011, 81) introduces the notion of nudity in relation to human action. In his words, 
‘to know nudity is not to know an object but only an absence of veils, only a possibility of 
knowing’. In other words, nudity is a condition of ‘disclosedness’ (al-letheia), that is, 
‘unconcealment’ without which knowledge would not be possible (Agamben 2011, 81). He 
clarifies, ‘[t]he problem of nudity is, therefore, the problem of human nature in its relationship 
with grace’ (2011, 60), because ‘nudity is not actually a state but rather an event’ (2011, 65), 
one that ‘never reaches its completed form ... it never stops occurring’ (2011, 65). This means 
that there is in fact no such thing as nudity but only denuding. Robert (2013, 121) clarifies that 
nudity is an eventive apparatus that effected an epistemic passage for Adam and Eve, for whom 
the knowledge of their denuding was the knowledge of good and evil, described by Agamben 
(2011) as ‘the only content of their knowledge of good and evil is, therefore, nudity’. To Robert 
(2013, 121), nudity exposes knowability. Denuding, therefore, does not expose an object of 
knowledge but a potentiality for knowing: ‘What denuding reveals is revealability, which is a 
potentiality – one that is never actualized and, so, never manifested in or as revelation’ (2013, 
121). 
What follows is that, unless people engage with nudity in democratic encounters, the 
possibility that they would learn from one another would be very unlikely. Again, nudity or 
denudation is a condition of ‘pure visibility and presence’ whereby no secret is concealed 
(Agamben 2011, 81). So, for Agamben (2011, 84, 86), the nudity of the human body is its image 
of an unveiled appearance which is ‘infinitely free of secret’ – an appearance that exhibits its 
own vacuity and that allows the inapparent to take place. Put differently, nudity or denudation 
‘lets the absence of secrets be seen’, which means it expresses only a ‘letting-be-seen’ 
(Agamben 2011, 89). When nudity unveils secrets of the human self then a point is reached in 
which ‘clarification is no longer possible’ because an appearance has been exhibited ‘beyond 
all mystery and all meaning’ (Agamben 2011, 89, 90). In relation to democratic encounters, 
such a form of engagement is only subjected to denudation when the interaction between 
humans unveils what is mysterious in the sense that the covert is opened up to humans engaged 
in the interaction. Here, the unveiling of the strange requires of humans to take risks on the 
basis of disclosedness and demystification. That is, risk taking increases when the mysterious 
is on the verge of being denudated. Moreover, when the self experiences moments of 
denudation where nothing is concealed or censored, where secrets of the self have been 
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unmasked, democratic engagement becomes open and unrestrained, thus enveloped by a ‘pure 
appearance’ or ‘absence of secrets’ (Agamben 2011, 90). Consequently, the denuded body 
assumes a new purpose that ‘allows the very potentiality that has manifested itself in the act to 
appear’ (Agamben 2011, 102), which, according to Agamben, ‘succeeds in bringing together 
within a single place and in a single gesture both exercise and inoperativity, economic body 
and glorious body, function and its suspension’ (2011, 101‒102). 
How else can democratic engagement be substantively open if human thought in and about 
particular situations is not unconcealed or unveiled? The point we are making is that only a 
demystified form of democratic engagement could deepen the risks humans take to elicit 
unconstrained encounters where nothing is held back and where human thought has been made 
transparent and accessible to all others. Furthermore, the possibility that human action can 
unveil mysterious meanings that could enhance people’s interactions (and, by implication, their 
risk taking) would only contribute towards humans’ intimacy, in other words, their knowability 
(nudity) in sustaining unconstrained forms of democratic engagement.  
To take a risk is tantamount to disclosing something that would otherwise have remained 
concealed. So, when one takes a risk, one divulges (unveils) what would otherwise have 
remained veiled or held back from others. Unveiling one’s nudity is therefore an act of exposing 
what would otherwise have remained covered. Hence, to take a risk implies denudifying 
oneself. Inasmuch as risk taking is associated with disclosing oneself, so the Agambenian 
notion of rhythm (cf. Agamben 2004) is linked to a visible presence that assigns to a nude image 
its ‘flows in time’, that is, its ‘movement’ (Agamben 2004, 99). For Agamben, this movement 
or ‘eternal flow’ of rhythm gives to risk taking ‘a stop, an interruption in the incessant flow … 
[that] gives and reveals the particular status, the mode of presence proper to the work of art 
[nude image] or the landscape we have before our eyes’ (Agamben 2004, 99). Agamben goes 
on to assert that being ‘arrested’ by nudity means ‘both to hold back, to suspend, and to hand 
over, to present, to offer’ (Agamben 2004, 100). What follows from the aforementioned, is that 
like risk taking, rhythm ‘gives and holds back’ (Agamben 2004, 100). So, when a nude image 
presents itself to others it gives and holds back. Nudity is therefore subjected to a rhythmic 
movement of disclosure and retention. Put differently, denudification involves a rhythmic flow 
of movement whereby the image presents itself to the one witnessing the image, in other words, 
the image is disclosed or unconcealed to others. Concomitantly, with the unveiling of the nude 
image, the witnesses to the image look at what is discernible with moments of imperceptibility, 
as if the nude image is at times not visible because of an interruption encountered due to that 
with which the witness is confronted.  
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This brings us to the question: What is the implication of rhythmic risk taking for 
democratic engagement? 
 
DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENT AS RHYTHMIC RISK TAKING 
Thus far, we have shown that democratic engagement is not merely associated with enframing 
people’s collective existence, it is rather also an enlargement of people’s moral perspectives ‘in 
virtue of their humanity simpliciter’ (Benhabib 2011, 75). And, as per Gutmann and 
Thompson’s (2004, 178) argument, democratic engagement is explicitly concerned with people 
seeking moral agreement when they can engage in and/or about public policy through 
deliberation, and ‘maintaining mutual respect when they cannot [reach agreement]’. But, as we 
have also shown through Agamben’s (1994) conception of denudation, nudity is subjected to a 
rhythmic movement of disclosure and retention. In other words, while humans are prepared to 
reveal themselves inasmuch as they are disinclined to do so, much of the decision to reveal or 
to conceal is taken from the engagement that one human being meets in the other. The rhythm 
of this encounter, therefore, is subject to how one presents the image, and then how the other 
witnesses and responds to the image. In this sense, like denudification, democratic engagement 
takes on a rhythmic flow of movement whereby one human being unveils him/herself to the 
other, while the other witnesses and responds. Without the witnessing or the rejoinder, the 
engagement cannot be described or understood as such, because an engagement necessarily 
implies the presence, meeting or involvement of another. In other words, if a democratic 
engagement is to occur, then the act of unveiling or revealing oneself to the other has to be met 
by a response. To our minds, this engagement is best understood as a rhythmic movement 
because engagements are neither fixed nor pre-determined. How does one know how the other 
might respond if one should reveal oneself? This is the inherent risk within the act of 
denudification or unveiling – one human makes him/herself known to the other but he or she 
cannot know how the other might respond. If the response is not reciprocal, or is one of 
concealment, then the one who has initiated the unveiling might be inclined towards re-
concealment and withdrawal from the engagement. But how else might democratic 
engagements unfold, if one is not prepared to risk the unexpected, the improbable, and even the 
chaotic?  
In The man without content (2004), Agamben explains that the status of a human’s 
dwelling on earth is a practical one, because of his or her productive status, i.e. he or she 
developed from non-being to being, and from concealment into the light of work or production. 
To Agamben (2004, 43), the presupposition of work is ‘bare biological existence, the cyclical 
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processes of the human body, whose metabolism and whose energy depend on the basic 
products of labor’. To Agamben, a conception of work (doing) is so intimately tied to the 
biological cycle of humans that any attempts to argue differently have always returned to an 
interpretation of life, of man as a living being in which the philosophy of man’s ‘doing’ 
continues to be a philosophy of life (2004, 44). Everything, says Agamben (2004, 58), is 
rhythm, ‘[T]he entire destiny of man is one heavenly rhythm, just as every work of art is one 
rhythm ...’. Rhythm, says Agamben, is not structure, but is instead the principle of presence 
that opens and maintains the work of art in its original space. Paradoxically, he explains, it is 
neither calculable nor rational; yet, it is also not irrational. The essence of rhythm, he continues, 
is to flow, as in the case of water, or a musical piece, which flows, and then stops. As such, says 
Agamben, ‘[w]e perceive rhythm as something that escapes the incessant flight of instants and 
appears almost as the presence of an atemporal dimension in time’ (2004, 62).  
In his analogy between music and art, Agamben (2004) states that rhythm is something 
that escapes an ‘incessant flight of instance’. If something does not appear incessantly and/or 
instantaneously, it actually appears rhythmically, in other words, there is a moment of holding 
and giving back as one might listen and be moved by the crescendos of music. Agamben’s 
(2004) argument is that in the same way that we listen to music, we look at art where we 
experience a suspension in time in which we reflect on the painting and re-depict the image as 
the painting reveals itself. In Agambenian fashion, beholding a work of art is not a static action, 
but rather ecstatic. ‘It means ecstasy in the epochal in the opening of rhythm which gives and 
holds back ...’. In this sense, we compare a democratic encounter to an opening of rhythm in 
which one reveals one’s thoughts momentarily, and then holds back as one waits for a response. 
To our minds, then, democratic engagement as rhythmic action, firstly, counters the idea that 
democratic engagement is expected to be linear or ordered. As an action which might be 
forthcoming (unveiled) or not (concealed), one becomes aware that democratic engagement can 
take on forms of openness or disorderliness, inasmuch as it might retreat towards concealment 
or secrecy. Secondly, democratic engagement as rhythmic action speaks to the very human 
composition of being human, that is, humans are in a perpetual condition of movement and 
cycles. Their natural state, therefore, is that of being in rhythm. To expect, therefore, that 
humans are naturally inclined towards that which is linear and pre-empted is not only to 
discount the natural state of human rhythm, but it is also to be inattentive to the unexpected and 
the unexplored, which ought to constitute democratic engagement. Finally, when a human 
reveals his or her nude image (denudification), he or she exposes both his or her knowability of 
him/herself, as well as his or her potentiality for knowing. In other words, through engaging 
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with others, by unveiling him/herself, he or she shows his or her willingness to make 
him/herself known to others, so that others might make themselves known to him or her. 
Through a form of democratic engagement, which assumes a form of denudation, the possibility 
is always there that human action will be enacted through an unveiling of the self that is 
infinitely free of secret. In turn, a denudified democratic engagement as rhythmic holds the 
potentiality of unconstrained and unrestricted movement of human engagement, because it is 
naturally synchronised to what it means to be human. 
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